Three Ethical Tools (Part Two)

In Part One of this two-part article, I discussed the first two basic tools of ethical thinking; I called them the harm-benefit approach and the rights approach. According to the harm-benefit approach, we are to pay special attention to the harms (bad results or costs) and the benefits (good results) of any action, and choose the action that results is the greatest net benefit, in the long run, for all affected parties. According to the second approach, we focus on rights that people are due, and the respect we owe to people. According to this approach, we are not to try to produce beneficial or good results if that would involve the violation of people’s rights.

Here in Part Two, I’ll discuss the third approach, which is somewhat different from the first two, and is easily overlooked. One name that this approach goes under is virtue ethics; another is character ethics. One difference between this tool of ethical thought and the two previous tools is that both of the first two tools or approaches focus on the question “what should I do?”, while virtue ethics focuses on the question “what sort of person should I be?” Thus, in addressing the question “what should I do?” the first two approaches come up with lists of “do’s and don’ts,” lists of fundamental human rights, and general rules like keep promises. But from the virtue point of view, the list of “do’s and don’ts,” lists of rules about rights, and so on, although fine in a limited way, fail to reach the larger question of what kind of person I should be. They give me some direction, but they still require the use of judgment in their application. And the original purpose of the “weighing” metaphor (where I weigh the costs against the benefits) and the list of rights was supposed to make it so that correct moral judgments could be read as simply as I could read a scale – or a checklist. But one problem is that rules addressing “what should I do?” cannot really be reduced to simple balance scales or lists. (I am reminded of a recent case at a Burger King in which an employee refused to serve a young mother on the basis of the rule “no shoes, no service” – since the 6-month-old infant she was carrying had no shoes on. The rule was applied in this case, but judgment completely failed. It takes judgment to apply rules correctly.)

The virtue approach is a very old one, dating from before the birth of Christianity, and going back at least to the time of the ancient Greeks. The Greek word that is traditionally translated as “virtue” could also be translated as “excellence.” Excellence is something that even an inanimate object, such as a building, could have. But, in the case of people, we can make ourselves good (or excellent or virtuous or admirable). This is something that we find attractive. We’re very attracted to the idea of being responsible people who can be counted upon; we’re not attracted to the idea of being irresponsible or deceitful or manipulative. We want to be excellent human beings – not lousy people.

We can look at virtue from a couple of perspectives. One perspective is as if we are looking at a person of virtue admiringly. (It’s a curious fact, by the way, that we are able to recognize virtue in another person even if we aren’t excellent ourselves. We can admire the strength of character in a person who takes charge of a meeting -- for example, a meeting about the possible future manufacture and sale of dangerous computer monitors! – or the way this person speaks up to the boss, even if we ourselves lack the courage to do these things.) Another perspective we can take is not in a situation where virtue is already attained, but where it is still in the process of development. Consider honesty, for example. It’s an admirable character trait. (This could serve as the definition of a virtue -- an admirable character trait.) But how can a person become honest? The ancient Greek answer was: by doing honest things. By acting and speaking as the honest person would act and speak. (Of course, this works the other way around too – a person can become a liar and a cheat by lying and cheating,) Thus, we encourage our children to develop admirable traits; and we are concerned about the kind of company they keep and the habits they might pick up. And we grown-ups too can reflect on our own behavior and find both strengths and weaknesses.

One way in which the idea of virtue differs from the first two approaches is that virtue is seen as something positive, something that we find attractive and that draws us on, whereas the rules of the other approaches can sometimes have a constraining or limiting quality. Admirable traits – the kind of character traits you would be pleased to see in a friend or in your child or in yourself – can be felt as coming from within us, rather than being imposed from the outside in the way that rules sometime are. Even if we first see those traits in others, or read about them or hear about them, we still make our own efforts to embody those traits. We want to make them ours.

Virtue ethics has another aspect. I mentioned that even things (like buildings) can have excellent features. This is related to the fact that whole groups of people -- companies, universities, and professions, for example – although they aren’t people themselves, can also have virtuous traits. One country might be thoroughly corrupt, for example, and in another everything is totally on the level. In one university a student feels like a cog in a machine, and in another the student is treated as a real human being. One company is alienating, and another makes me proud to be affiliated with it. Engineers are pleased to be members of an honorable and respected profession. On the other hand, nobody wants to be associated with a group or organization that is no more than a joke. There is a sense in which collections or organizations of people can be healthy, and it is that sort of organization that we all desire to be affiliated with.

There is a sense in which virtue ethics is not really in competition with the first two approaches, for it is clearly an admirable human trait to be concerned about possible harms that one might cause, and to be concerned with the rights and respect that are due to others. But I think that virtue is unjustly neglected in our moral thought and language, and that the language of virtue – concerned as it is with courage, honesty, trustworthiness, etc. – cannot be set aside in favor of blander (and generally negative) talk about harm and the violation of rights.

All three of the ethical tools I have discussed can be thought of as contributing to a fuller understanding of moral matters; that is, they can be regarded as working together rather than as being in competition with each other. Each emphasizes a different aspect of morality; but working together, they give us a fuller moral view than any one approach could.